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Chapter 7

UNPLEASANT FACTS
The Supreme Court's Response
to Empirical Research
on Capital Punishment
PHOEBE C. ELLSWORTH

Slowly at first, and then with accelerating frequency, the courts have
begun to examine, consider, and sometimes even require empirical data.
From 1960 to 1981, for example, use of the terms "statistics" and
"statistical" in Federal District and Circuit Court opinions increased by
almost 15 times. 1 Of course, citation rates indicate only that a topic is
considered worthy of mention, not that it is taken seriously, or even
understood. Nonetheless, in a number of areas, such as jury composition
and employment discrimination, the courts have come to rely on
empirical data as a matter of course.
In the last 25 years, empirical research has been central to most major
challenges to the constitutionality of capital punishment. The research
involved has covered an enormous range of methods, from surveys to
simulations, from econometric analyses to laboratory experiments, and
the presentation of the research to the courts has generally been both
comprehensive and sophisticated. There is probably no other area of
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This chapter was written while the author was a Fellow at the Center
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I am grateful to the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and to the James Mc Keen Cattell Fundfor financial
support, and to the Center Staff and Fellows for time, space, unsurpassable services, and
intellectual stimulation. Joseph B. Kadane and Samuel R. Gross read thefirst draft ofthis
chapter and made it better.
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criminal law in which the Supreme Court has been faced with such
well-organized and wide-ranging empirical demonstrations. It is quite
likely that comparable empirical data about some other issue would be
persuasive to the Court; when the issue is the death penalty, however,
the Court is not persuaded. In case after case, the majority of the Justices
have been faced with empirical research that supports an outcome they
do not want.
Three major empirical questions have been brought before the Court
in relation to capital punishment. The first is the issue of deterrence: Is
the death penalty more effective than life imprisonment as a deterrent to
murder? The second is the issue of discrimination: Are decisions about
which criminals should be executed and which should be allowed to live
based in part on the race of the person accused or on the race of the
victim? The third is the issue of the fairness of capital juries: Does the
common practice of removing strong opponents of capital punishment
from the jury create juries that are biased toward a guilty verdict? The
Court has dealt with the data on each of these issues somewhat
differently-sometimes by calling them inconclusive, sometimes by
calling them irrelevant, and sometimes by evading them. I shall examine
the Court's use of the data presented on each of these three questions,
the first two briefly, and the third at greater length.

DETERRENCE
~ost people who favor the death penalty believe that it deters
murderers (Ellsworth and Ross, 1983). It seems commonsensical that a
person contemplating murder would be deterred by the threat of death.
If so, then the existence of a death penalty is morally justified because it
saves innocent lives. Opponents of the death penalty reason differently.
They argue that few homicides are the product of such rational
calculation. Most murderers do not stop to weigh the costs and benefits
of their act. Those who do may figure (correctly) that the odds of
execution are vanishingly small, so it is worth the risk. At any rate the
\idlDli:l!m<,&\•~gettmg killed at the time of committing the murder is
considerably greater than the likelihood of getting killed after convictiol!:J Also, an argument for a powerful deterrent effect of capital
punishment requires that it be a significantly more effective deterrent
than life imprisonment. That is, the hypothetical person contemplating
murder would go ahead with it if he considered the prospect of spending
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the rest of his life in prison, but not if he considered the prospect of
execution. 2
mntil 1974, the empirical research on the deterrent effects of the death
penalty was completely consistent: No researcher claimed to have found
a significant deterrent effect. The research was dominated by the work
of Thorsten Selliqjl959, 1980), who had carried out a comprehensive
series of studies covering many different times and places, and using a
variety of complementary research designs. He examined neighboring
states with and without the death penalty, and found that homicide rates
were no lower in the death penalty states (in fact they were usually
slightly higher). Over time the levels of homicide in contiguous states
tended to rise and fall in synchrony, providing some indication that the
states were in fact comparable, that similar forces affected the homicide
rate. He also examined states and countries that had a death penalty and
then abolished it to see if the homicide levels would rise; and he
examined states that instituted a death penalty after a period without it
to see if the number of homicides would fall. The death penalty had no
noticeable effect in either case. He looked at crimes that are especially
likely to be punished by death, such as killing police officers, killing for ·
hire, and killing by prisoners serving life sentences, and again found no
differences between the rates of these crimes in jurisdictions with and
without a death penalty. One of the great beauties of Sellin 's work is that
each study answers a question left unanswered or compensates for a
methodological shortcoming in the previous works, in a classic demonstration of the incremental elegance of converging research methods.
f Numerous other researchers, working independently, reached the same
conclusion: The death penalty has no detectable long-term effect on
homicide. It is not a more effective deterrent than life imprisonmen_n
(see, Lempert, 1981; Dike, 1982, for comprehensive reviews).
Another possible type of deterrence might be called "immediate
deterrence." Maybe deterrent effects exist, but are very short-lived, so
that right after an execution when the death penalty is particularly
salient in the mind of the potential murderer, homicide rates will drop.
Although there is considerably less research on this topic, there is no
evidence whatsoever of such deterrence. In fact there is some evidence
that executions stimulate potential killers to kill sooner (Dann, 1935;
Bowers and Pierce, 1980).
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the constitutionality of the nation's
death penalty laws became an open question. The Court held that all the
capital punishment statutes then in effect violated the Eighth Amend-
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ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, but stopped
short of saying that capital punishment itself was unconstitutional.
Most of the basic empirical questions that have figured in subsequent
cases were raised in the opinions in Furman, but none were decided.
Each of the Justices wrote an opinion detailing the considerations that
he felt were important in deciding whether the death penalty was cruel
and unusual. Instead of a coherent majority position, there were five
separate one-vote opinions. Although deterrence was mentioned in
several of the Furman opinions, only Justice Marshall explicitly cited
the research, concluding that it proved that the death penalty was
excessive, because its deterrent function could be served just as well by
other penalties. Chief Justice Burger stated that no one had definitely
proven that the death penalty was not a superior deterrent. However, in
his view, empirical research on the issue was ofno consequence, because
deciding that sort of factual issue was not necessary or appropriate in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment. Justice White accepted the argument that current death penalty laws had little deterrent effect (without
citing studies), but reasoned that they were ineffective because hardly
anyone was actually executed.
Although the social science research on deterrence was not discussed
in any of the Furman opinions besides Justice Marshall's, it was
probably influential in preventing any of the Justices from maintaining
the simplistic common sense argument that the threat of death must be
an effective deterrent, and therefore capital punishment is acceptable
because it saves lives. The influence of empirical data cannot be
completely evaluated by focusing only on what is said; it is also
important to consider what might have been said had there been no
data, or different data.
Since Furman had not said that capital punishment itself was
unconstitutional, state legislatures hurried to enact death penalty laws
that would pass constitutional muster. By 1976, when the next major
capital punishment case was decided, 35 states had enacted new
legislation. It was generally assumed that the main reason the preFurman laws were declared unconstitutional was that they permitted
such unbridled discretion that there was no principled or systematic way
of distinguishing among those who were sentenced to death and those
who were not. Thus the arbitrariness of the death penalty was the central
issue, but the issue of deterrence was also raised.
By 1976, however, the empirical record had also changed. Against the
unanimity of the pre-Furman research on deterrence, a single new study
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was presented as part of the solicitor general's brief, purporting to show
that executions deterred homicide. The study, by Isaac Ehrlich (1975)
used complex statistical analysis and economic theory, and found a
small but significant deterrent effect. Unlike Sellin's research, which
could be readily understood by any graduate student or Supreme Court
Justice who chose to read and consider it thoughtfully, Ehrlich's work
could not easily be evaluated without specialized expertise. The brief
against capital punishment included several equally complex analyses
by other experts discrediting Ehrlich's work. By now it has been
est ·
t Ehrlich's clai
ere unfounded.The research record
still shows no evidence that the deat pen
re
e
n I e imprisonmen
tke, 1982; Lempert, 1981;
, or reviews of the empirical evidence).
·ticisms of Ehrlich's work
ore
alon
ith Eh
s study. The briefs on
both sides devoted considerable space to equations, technical discussions, and theoretical and methodological disputes. Yet the deterrence
question is mentioned in only one of the five cases that the Court
considered in deciding whether capital punishment was constitutional,
and even in that one it receives only the most superficial attention.
Justice Stewart, in his lead opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, concluded that
J!te evtdence oft cletertefice 1s ambiguous, presumably because there WM,..
disagreement among the researchers: On the one hand, Ehrlich claimed
to have found a deterrent effect; on the other hand, everyone else
claimed not to, whether they were analyzing their own data or Ehrlich's.
Stewart goes on, illogically, to argue that since the research record is,,
inconclusive, the death penalty must be a significant deterrent to some
people, and therefore that capital umshment ,s not w,tnout Jusmlcat1on . ..--.u.., , researc on eterrence has not p aye a ma1or ro em
any of the numerous Su.12fCroe Court decisions on the death penalty.
Had Ehrlich's study not existed, or had its inadequacies been
recognized, at least some of the Justices might have felt compelled to
deal with the massive body of scientific research indicatj_ng that the
death penalty could not be justified on the grounds that it prevents
murders from occurring, because it doe~_.no-C ·
Recognizing the inadequacies ofEhtfich's study would not have been
an easy task for a Supreme Court)ustice. Statistical analysis was not a
form of reasoning that was familiar to the Justices, and the presentations
in the briefs were quite abstruse; nonetheless, given a real willingness to
try to understand the data, the task would not have been impossible.
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Indeed, Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion contains an excellent
critical analysis of the research, concluding that no deterrent effect had
been found by Ehrlich or anyone else. It still stands as one of the most
lucid analyses of complex empirical data to be found in a Supreme
Court opinion.
f"The Justices joining the lead opinion chose a much easier method of
dealing with the social science data, simply noting that there was
disagreement in the scientific community, and apparently deciding,
therefore, that such an "inconclusive" record need not be considered at
all. Behind this is a tacit requirement of complete consensus within the
social science community before its research on an issue even need be
considered, a standard far beyond what is required for any other sort of
evidence. The issue of deterrence was erased from serious consideration
by a single dissenting voice from the research community. It is
distressing to think that the most influential thing a social scientist can
do is to give the Court an excuse to ignore some body of research,,(
If a similar body of research had been presented on a different issue,
such as the relative deterrent efficacy of different sanctions in some area
of administrative law, the Court's reaction probably would have been
different. But when the death penalty is involved, lay people reason less
rationally (Ellsworth and Ross, 1983), and so do Supreme Court
Justices. When the data compel a conclusion that might threaten the
institution of capital punishment, something must be done about the
data. In the case of deterrence, the existence of one flimsy study
contradicting a mass of consistent research allowed the Court ta avai.d
~nsidering the evidence on the grounds that "experts disa~ee."
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Although advocates of the death penalty readily incorporated
Ehrlich's study into their arguments for capital punishment (e.g., van
den Haag, 1975, and the brief for petitioner in Gregg), evidence of
deterrence is not essential to a principled position in favor of the death
penalty. An advocate might argue that even if the utilitarian functions of
capital punishment could be served equally well by sentencing murderers
to life in prison, the death penalty is justified because it is just. Those
who commit the very worst crimes deserve the very worst penalty.
Evidence of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death
penalty is disastrous to the argument that capital punishment is serving
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the ends of justice, because it means that many of those who actually
receive the worst penalty are not those who have committed the worst
crimes, but those who have the darkest complexions. The deterrence
argument is that the death penalty is cruel and unusual because it is
excessive-other penalties would work as well; the discrimination
argument is that the death penalty is cruel and unusual because it is
unfair. And the basis for this unfairness is one that the Court has found
completely unacceptable in numerous other contexts. Being born black
is no fault of the person, and it generally means a lifetime of slights,
risks, and disadvantages, most of which are beyond the reach of the law
to correct. The Supreme Court has been stern in combating racial
discrimination in other contexts, such as racially imbalanced juries
(Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880; Batson v. Kentucky, 1986), school
segregation (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954), and employment
discrimination ( Griggs v. Duke Power and Light Co., 1971 ). If the death
penalty discriminates on the basis of race, not only the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is
involved, but also the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Like research on deterrence, research on discrimination in the
application of the death penalty has a long history. In the nineteenth
century, several state laws made certain crimes punishable by death if
the offender was black, but not if he was white (Bowers, 1974). By the
twentieth century the laws were gone, but most studies still showed that
when arrested, blacks were more likely than whites to be indicted for
capital crimes; when charged with capital crimes, blacks were more
likely to be convicted; when convicted, blacks were more likely to be
sentenced to death; and when sentenced to death, blacks were more
likely to be executed (see Bowers, 1974; Dike, 1982). Racial effects were
substantial across a variety of potentially criminal acts, and enormous
for the crime of rape. Over the last hundred years hardly anyone has
been executed for rape except in the southern and border states, and
hardly any white man has been executed for rape anywhere in the
country (Bowers, 1984). The most striking data were presented by
Wolfgang and Reidel (1973) in a study of rape convictions and
executions in 11 southern states from 1945 to 1965. They found that
death sentences for rape had virtually disappeared except in cases in
which the rapist was a black man and the victim was white: Black men
accused of raping white women were 18 times more likely to sentenced
to death than white rapists or black men accused of raping black
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women. Similar trends have been found in studies of death sentences for
homicide (e.g., Zimring et al., 1976), although the disparities are less
extreme.
Wolfgang and Reidel's data were considered and rejected by the
Eighth Circuit in the case of Maxwell v. Bishop (1968) on the grounds
that very few of the cases came from the jurisdiction in which Maxwell
was tried; some factor other than race or the other variables that
Wolfgang and Reidel had considered might have accounted for the
disparity; and the study did not show that Maxwell's particular jury had
been motivated by racial prejudice when they sentenced him to death.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Maxwell on other grounds,
without touching the discrimination issue.
In 1972 the data on racial discrimination came before the Court again
in Furman, as part of the more general argument that the death penalty
was unconstitutional because the people who were executed were not
the people who most deserved to die. If there was any systematic
difference between those who were killed and those who were allowed to
live, it was an unacceptable one, such as income, class, or, most
obviously, race.
What little consensus there was in the Furman case seemed to
converge on the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty laws
then in effect produced no legitimate distinction between the few who
were selected to die and the many who were not. At best, death sentences
were arbitrary and capricious. Most of the Justices shied away from
addressing Wolfgang and Reidel's study directly, although it is difficult
to imagine that it had no effect on their decision that the imposition of
the death penalty under current laws was unfair. Only Justice Douglas
and Justice Marshall explicitly asserted that the death penalty discriminated against the poor and the black. Justice Stewart based his opinion
on arbitrariness. Death sentences were "cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual," although he
also acknowledged that if there were any factor that particularly
characterized those sentenced to death, it was the "constitutionally
impermissible basis of race" (Furman, 1972, p. 310).
Like the research on deterrence, the research on discrimination was
barely mentioned in the Furman opinions, but it was probably
influential. The Court could have concluded that those who were
sentenced to death were those who had committed the most heinous
crimes. The Justices could have concluded that those who were
sentenced to death were in the same groups that were the victims of
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discrimination in other social contexts. Or they could, as they did,
conclude that there was no valid basis for distinguishing between those
who were sentenced to death and those who were not: The system was
arbitrary. The social science data may have persuaded a majority away
from the first position, but some Justices may have chosen to emphasize
the more neutral problem of arbitrariness rather than endorsing the
much more inflammatory idea that black lives had been treated as more
dispensable than white lives. After all, the immediate practical outcome
was the same. Current death penalty laws were struck down, and current
death sentences were canceled.
In Gregg v. Georgia ( 1976) and its companion cases, arbitrariness was
the central issue. State laws that provided for mandatory death
sentences for certain crimes were struck down, whereas state laws that
provided standards by which the unbridled discretion rejected in
Furman could be "suitably directed and limited" were upheld. Racial
discrimination was not mentioned. Presumably a law that prevented
arbitrariness by limiting the aggravating factors that could be considered
in imposing the death penalty would also prevent racial discrimination.
Once again, it is quite likely that the research on racial discrimination
was disturbing to the majority Justices, but that they felt that in
endorsing the guided discretion statutes they could solve the problem
without acknowledging it.
In 1977, a case came before the Supreme Court that many observers
felt would force the Court to deal with the issue of racial discrimination
directly. It was the case of Coker v. Georgia, raising the issue of the
constitutionality of capital punishment for the crime of rape. The
evidence, as we have seen, indicated that the death penalty for rape had
long since been practically abandoned, except for black men who raped
white women. Racial prejudice seemed the unavoidable conclusion.
The Court in Coker did avoid reaching that conclusion, however. In
fact it avoided any mention of the research on racial patterns in capital
sentencing for rape. Instead, the Court held that capital punishment for
rape was unconstitutional because it was grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime and therefore excessive. Again, the Court reached
the conclusion that would be compelled by the data on racial discrimination, but reached it on other grounds. Curiously enough, the Court
actually based its finding that the death penalty was disproportionate on
empirical data, of a sort. Justice White, in the lead opinion, argued that
public attitudes toward a penalty should be considered in deciding
whether that penalty was excessive for a particular crime. As a means of
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ascertaining public attitudes, he examined the history of the death
penalty for rape, pointing out that few national or international
jurisdictions still punished rape by death, and that although after the
Furman decision many states reenacted death penalty statutes for
murder, they did not do so for rape. He also pointed out that even when
the death penalty was allowed for rape, juries hardly ever imposed it,
opting for a lesser penalty in 9 out of 10 cases, thus indicating that the
public felt it was excessive. (Of course he avoided all mention of the
racial factors distinguishing those rare cases in which the juries did
sentence rapists to death. He also neglected to mention that the jury
chooses a penalty less than death in 8 out of 10 murder cases.) 3 He even
cited public opinion poll data. In sum, it is hard to resist the conclusion
that the Court went out of its way to avoid basing its decision on the
powerful empirical evidence of racial discrimination, even to the extent
of citing much more fragmentary empirical data on another issue.
After 1972 state legislatures that favored the death penalty drafted
new statutes designed to protect against the arbitrary and discriminatory
imposition of capital punishment that had been held unconstitutional in
Furman. In Gregg v. Georgia (1976) the Court found acceptable
Georgia's new statute, which provided for a bifurcated trial with guilt
decided at the first phase, followed by a separate sentencing phase in
which new evidence might be introduced to help the jury decide whether
the defendant should live or die. Factors that the jurors were permitted
to consider as aggravating or mitigating the crime were enumerated, and
provision was made for the Georgia Supreme Court to review all cases
to make sure that the system was working properly-that the death
penalty was reserved for the most aggravated cases. Similar statutes in
Texas and Florida were upheld in the companion cases to Gregg (Jurek
v. Texas, 1976; Proffitt v. Florida, 1976), and, by implication, all
statutes employing comparable methods of limiting the jury's discretion
were held to be constitutional.
Because the laws had changed, pre-Furman data were no longer
sufficient to demonstrate racial discrimination. The question now was
whether the new guided discretion statutes did what they were intended:
to prevent arbitrariness and discrimination. A crude examination of
America's death row population suggested no improvement: In 1971,
just before the Furman decision, 53% of the people on death row were
nonwhite; in 1978, 62% were nonwhite (Reidel, 1976). Raw figures,
however, were no longer enough. Research on discrimination had
become substantially more sophisticated, and the courts were becoming
much more accustomed to complex statistical analyses in other kinds of
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discrimination cases. However overwhelming the raw figures, litigators
assumed that they would be insufficient to prove discrimination. They
had to prove not only that blacks were disproportionately sentenced to
death, but that they were sentenced to death because they were black,
not because they had committed more aggravated murders. If they
could not prove that race was the reason, they had at least to prove that
no other legitimate reason distinguished the blacks on death row from
murderers who were sentenced to life imprisonment.
By l 980, eight years after the Furman decision, studies of the racial
consequences of the post-Furman guided discretion statutes began to
appear. Bowers and Pierce ( 1980) found that in Georgia, Florida, Texas,
and Ohio (these states accounted for about 70% of the death sentences in
the time period studied), a familiar pattern emerged: "Black killers and
the killers of whites were more likely to receive the death penalty in all
four states, with black killers of white victims overwhelmingly more
likely to receive the death sentence" (Dike, 1982, p. 49; see also Zeisel,
1981). With increasingly sophisticated statistical controls, later studies
found that the effect of the defendant's race could not conclusively be
shown to have an effect independent of the effects of legitimate
aggravating factors such as committing murder in the course of another
felony or killing a stranger. This means that it is impossible to tell
whether the reason blacks are more likely than whites to be sentenced to
death is that they are black. The race-of-victim effect, however, continues
to show up strongly in the best-controlled studies; killing a white person
is much more likely to result in a death sentence than is killing a black
person (Radelet, 1981 [Florida]; Radelet and Pierce, 1985 [Florida
capital charges]; Jacoby and Paternoster, 1982 [South Carolina capital
charges]; Gross and Mauro, 1984 [eight states]). In one study the
researchers collected data on over 400 variables in over a thousand
Georgia homicide prosecutions and found t.hat nothing could explain
away the discrimination against defendants who killed white people
(Baldus et al., 1983). Some 10 years later, it is clear that the guided
discretion statutes endorsed in Gregg v. Georgia have not succeeded in
preventing capital sentencing from being contaminated by the "constitutionally impermissible basis of race."
The issue and the new data came before the Court in the recent case of
McC/eskey v. Kemp (1987). The social science research on race-ofvictim effects were the core of the case, and this time there was no way
the Court could avoid facing the problem of racial discrimination in
capital sentencing.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Powell made a faint-hearted attempt
to question the conclusiveness of the research by arguing that the
correlational data presented could not actually prove that race was the
cause of the sentencing disparities. However, the Baldus study had
controlled for over 200 other variables and found that none of them,
alone or in combination, could explain the pattern of racial discrimination, and neither Justice Powell nor anyone else was able to come up
with any other explanation for the racial effects. History, common
sense, and the data all overwhelmingly supported the simple, obvious
explanation. The racial effects were due to race. The majority, however,
repeatedly referred to the correlation of death sentences with race as
"unexplained," for example, "where the discretion that is fundamental
to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is
unexplained is invidious" (Mccleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1778
[1987]).
The opinion is also written to make the death penalty invulnerable to
any future statistical challenges based on race, by holding that proof of
racial discrimination requires a demonstration of conscious, intentional
racial discrimination in the drafting of the law or the decision in the
particular case. That is, in order to succeed with a claim of racial
discrimination, a defendant must prove either (I) "that the decision
makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose" [emphasis in
original](l07 S. Ct. at 1766), or(2) "that the Georgia legislature enacted
or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated
racially discriminatory effect" [emphasis in original] (107 S. Ct. at
1769).
A juror or a prosecutor must come forth and admit that McCleskey
was sentenced to death because he was black and he killed a white man, a
highly unlikely event because neither jurors nor prosecutors are asked to
account for their decisions, and even if they were, they would almost
always be unable or unwilling to say that race was a factor. Or, a
legislature must come forth and admit that the capital punishment
statute was designed to produce racial bias. Otherwise, the Equal
Protection clause does not apply.
Once again it is clear that the majority Justices (five of them, in
McCleskey) value the death penalty so highly that they are willing to
ignore the inescapable implications of the social science research and to
undermine fundamental constitutional guarantees. The majority admitted that the system for deciding who lives and who dies is imperfect, and
conceded that the evidence of discrimination found in the Baldus study
would have been persuasive if the case had involved discrimination in
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jury selection or employment. Traditionally, the Court has assumed that
the decision to impose the death penalty should be safeguarded with
higher standards of fairness than other sorts of legal decisions. In
McC/eskey, the Court has reversed this traditional attitude. Empirical
evidence that would be sufficient to protect McCleskey's job was not
considered sufficient to save his life.
Finally, the majority spent some time describing the sanctity of trial
by jury, and their reluctance to tamper with the collective discretion of a
representative jury of one's peers. The jury, "representative of a criminal
defendant's community, assures a 'diffused impartiality,' in the jury's
task of 'expressing the conscience of the community on the ultimate
question of life or death"' (107 S. Ct. at 1776, citations omitted).
However, as we shall see in the next section, the Court had already held
that juries in capital cases are not required to be as fair or as
representative of community opinion as juries in other cases.
DEATH-QUALIFIED JURIES

The issue of death qualification also raises questions about the
fairness of the administration of capital punishment laws, but it is
limited to a procedure-the refusal to allow citizens who adamantly
oppose the death penalty to serve as jurors in capital cases. Jurors who
state that they cannot consider imposing the death penalty are not
allowed to participate in the decision between death and life imprisonment, and hardly anyone has seriously questioned this practice. 4
However, these opponents of the death penalty are also excluded from
the jury that decides whether a person charged with a capital crime is
guilty or innocent of the crime, even when they state that they would be
entirely fair and impartial in weighing the evidence on guilt or
innocence. Thus in capital cases, unlike all other cases, the jury that
decides guilt or innocence is made up exclusively of people who would
be willing to sentence a person to death. The empirical question is: Is
such a "death-qualified" jury more likely than an ordinary jury to decide
that the defendant is guilty?
Most trial attorneys assume the biasing effects of death qualification
as a matter of common sense. Jurors who favor executions tend to favor
the arguments of the prosecution, whereas jurors who reject the death
penalty are more sympathetic to the defense. Even prosecutors occasionally admit to using death qualification in order to get a jury that is
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more likely to convict (Oberer, 1961). But lawyers' intuitions are not
evidence. The issue first came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1968 in
the case of Witherspoon v. Illinois(l968). Nearly half of the jurors called
to hear Witherspoon's case had been excused because of their "conscientious scruples" against the death penalty, and Witherspoon argued that
his jury was therefore biased toward conviction. He supported his case
with preliminary reports of three unpublished studies showing a
relationship between attitudes toward capital punishment and propensity to convict. The Court rejected the empirical data as "too
tentative and fragmentary" to demonstrate a bias toward conviction,
and it held that a modified form of death qualification, excluding only
the most adamant opponents of the death penalty, was constitutionally
permissible. However, the Court acknowledged that the question was an
empirical one, that its decision was a provisional one, made "in the light
of the presently available information"( Witherspoon v. Illinois, 1968, p.
518), and that future research might demonstrate that Witherspoon's
claims were correct.
By the time the issue came back to the Supreme Court in 1968, there
were 15 empirical studies in the record. They had been conducted over a
span of three decades, using a variety of samples from different areas of
the country, a variety of questions designed to identify the excluded
group, and a variety of different research methods. Attitude surveys of
random samples of the public were used to discover the size and racial
composition of the excluded group and to examine the correlation
between attitudes toward the death penalty and predispositions to favor
the prosecution or defense. Simulations were used for a direct examination of the relation between death penalty attitudes and verdicts
across a range of cases. Interviews with actual jurors were used to
establish that attitudes toward the death penalty predicted verdicts in
real cases. Another study examined the biasing effects of the deathqualifying voir dire itself, and still others looked at the effects of death
qualification on the quality of jury deliberation. Without exception, the
studies found that death-qualified jurors were more favorable to the
prosecution and more likely to vote guilty than the citizens who are
excluded from the jury.
For many reasons, death qualification is a particularly interesting
context in which to examine the Court's response to empirical data
related to capital punishment. First, the empirical question was posed
by the Court itself, in Witherspoon. Thus the Court ought to be
unusually receptive to empirical research specifically designed to answer
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that question. And the Court not only posed the question, but stated
that the holding in Witherspoon might be reversed if new evidence
established that death-qualified juries were "less than neutral with
respect to guilt"( Witherspoon v. Illinois, 1968, p. 520, n. 18, emphasis in
original).
Second, the constitutional issue was a Sixth Amendment issue, one
involving the fairness of the jury, rather than an Eighth Amendment
issue challenging the constitutionality of capital punishment per se. In
the past, the Court had shown considerable willingness to consider
social science data in cases involving jury composition (cf. Williams v.
Florida, (1968); Colgrove v. Battin, (1973); Ballew v. Georgia, (1978). 5
Third, the studies themselves were easy to understand. In most of the
studies two groups of people were compared, and the main data took the
form of percentages of each group favoring proprosecution attitudes or
voting guilty. The basic argument did not hinge on complex regression
equations or mathematical models. And of course the data agreed with
the "common sense" of most people familiar with the criminal justice
system.
Fourth, the social science data were immune from the criticism that
the data were introduced into the decision making process too late to
have received careful critical evaluation from the lower courts. This
criticism was clearly stated by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion
in Ballew v. Georgia ( 1978):
I have reservations as to the wisdom-as well as the necessity-of
Mr. Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on numerology derived
from statistical studies. Moreover, neither the validity nor the
methodology employed by the studies cited was subjected to the
traditional testing mechanisms of the adversary process. The
studies relied on merely represent unexamined findings of persons
interested in the jury system [p. 246].
The new data on death qualification had been introduced in an
evidentiary hearing that lasted several weeks, with testimony by five
expert witnesses for the defense and two for the prosecution (People v.
Moore, August-September, 1979). The California Supreme Court, in
Hovey v. Superior Court (1980), carried out an extraordinarily
thorough evaluation of the empirical record, perhaps the most knowledgeable analysis of social science data yet to appear in an appellate
court opinion. The California Supreme Court concluded that excluding
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jurors according to the Witherspoon standard did create juries that were
unconstitutionally biased toward guilty verdicts, but questioned the
applicability of the research to California juries, because in California,
jurors at the opposite end of the attitudinal spectrum could also be
excluded for cause. These are the jurors who state that they would be
unable to consider a penalty less than death for anyone convicted of a
potential capital crime, regardless of the circumstances.
Subsequent research indicated that the number of people so bloodthirsty that they would automatically vote for death without regard for
the evidence is minuscule-only l % of the population (Louis Harris,
1981), far too few to correct the bias toward guilty verdicts created by
death qualification (Kadane, 1984). In 1981 an evidentiary hearing was
conducted before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, when all the Hovey research was presented in addition to the
new evidence on "automatic death penalty" jurors. Again, experts
testified on both sides, and the Hovey record was introduced in
evidence. Again, the court evaluated the research very carefully and .
concluded that the practice of death qualification created juries that
were unconstitutionally biased against the defendant ( Grigsby v.
Mabry, 1983). The state appealed but the Eighth Circuit affirmed
(Grigsby v. Mabry, 1985). The Grigsby record, which included the
Hovey record, reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Lockhart
v. Mc Cree ( 1986). 6 Thus the data on death qualification had abundantly
fulfilled Justice Powell's requirement that they be subjected to the
"traditional testing mechanisms of the adversary system," having been
scrutinized in 26 days of evidentiary hearings and evaluated in 145 pages
of appellate court opinions.
Fifth, the Justices could not avoid evaluating the data, as they had
avoided the data on deterrence, by concluding that there was a lack of
consensus among the experts. Although the state tried to argue that the
social scientists' use of different research methods revealed a lack of
consensus, all 15 of the studies reached the same result. As the American
Psychological Association (APA) argued in its amicus brief, "the use of
diverse subjects, stimulus materials, and empirical methods does not
reveal a 'lack of consensus' but comports fully with the goal of
'generalization,' the accepted rubric for evaluating how far beyond the
specific facts of any one particular study one can apply its findings." Few
bodies of social science research have shown such consistency across
times, places, groups, and methods. The only "study" that failed to find
a difference in conviction rates is one that simply compared conviction
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rates in murder trials with those in robbery and burglary trials. No
prosecution expert was willing to present this study as evidence, and no
lower court found it worthy of consideration. In general, the prosecution
experts made minor methodological criticisms and conceded many of
the defense's empirical claims. No studies were introduced that contradicted those claims; the research record was uncontroverted. The state's
brief attacked the research primarily with vague global statements about
the "pseudoscientific" nature of social science research in general.
Finally, it would be very difficult for the Court to do what it did with
the issue of racial discrimination in the pre-McCleskey cases-make a
decision consistent with the research without mentioning the research
itself. The whole case was built on the empirical proposition, raised in
Witherspoon, that death qualification creates juries that are unlike all
other juries in that they are "less than neutral with respect to guilt. ''7
However, by 1986 there were over 1,500 people on death rows across
the country, most of whom had been convicted by death-qualified juries.
There were many more people serving life sentences who had also been
convicted by death-qualified juries. If the Court admitted that death
qualification unfairly prejudices the jury against capital defendants,
what would happen to these people? A decision in line with the evidence
would raise enormous legal and moral questions about retroactivity. It
seems quite possible, even probable, that if the practice of death
qualification had not existed before, and some state had attempted to
introduce it as a new restriction on the normal process ofjury selection,
the Court would have found the data persuasive, and declared the
procedure unconstitutional. But the political and practical consequences
of such a decision in 1986 were extremely unpalatable. Thus, as in
Mccleskey, the Court was faced with a substantial, consistent, and
highly persuasive body of data that pointed to a conclusion opposite to
the one the majority wanted to reach.
Given that the Court was determined to come out in favor of death
qualification, its decision was bound to be disappointing to the social
science research community. The actual decision was worse than
disappointing; it was lamentable. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, first attacked the research in ways that suggested that the
majority Justices had either not understood it or not read it, or that they
just didn't care. He then declared that it didn't matter how compelling
the data might be, because it is constitutionally permissible to try capital
cases before juries that are biased toward guilty verdicts. In short, "we
don't believe the data, but if we did it wouldn't matter."
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In the discussion that follows, I shall review the Lockhart opinion's
criticisms of the empirical data. In most instances, the same issues had
been reviewed in the Grigsby and Hovey opinions, and, when appropriate, I shall compare the three courts' methods of dealing with them.
1. The data are insufficient. In 1968, the Court in Witherspoon
rejected the existing studies as "too tentative and fragmentary to
establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the
prosecution in the determination of guilt" (p. 527). Most social scientists
would have agreed with this assessment. The Court had before it
incomplete, preliminary versions of three studies. Most social scientists
would recognize, however, that as new investigations accumulated, all
confirming the original conclusions, the research became less tentative
and fragmentary, and correspondingly more definite and complete.
Courts, however, have sometimes seemed to regard the phrase "tentative
and fragmentary" as having a binding precedential force on all research
that might be done on death qualification (Gross, 1984).
In Lockhart, Justice Rehnquist also concluded that the data were
insufficient to form the basis of a constitutional rule, but he did so in a
slightly more sophisticated manner. The 15 studies were lined up, and
each of them was found to have a flaw; each time a flaw was discovered,
the study was eliminated from the set until only one study was left.
"Surely," concluded Justice Rehnquist, "a 'per se constitutional rule' as
far-reaching as the one McCree proposes should not be based on the
results of the lone study that avoids this fundamental flaw" (Lockhart,
1986, p. 1764).
The first "flaw," accounting for the elimination of 8 of the 1? studies,
was that the studies "dealt solely with generalized attitudes and beliefs
about the death penalty and other aspects of the criminal justice system"
(Lockhart 1986, p. 1762). In fact, several of these studies measured
attitudes about the death penalty precisely in the terms defined by
Witherspoon, and in all of them the attitudes about "other aspects of the
criminal justice system" directly reflected a proprosecution (and therefore proconviction) bias. Among these attitudes, for example, are the
belief that defense attorneys are less trustworthy than prosecutors are,
that defendants who do not testify are guilty, that the insanity defense is
a loophole for guilty defendants, and that a confession should be
considered even if the judge rules it inadmissible. The emergence of the
same relation between death penalty and proprosecution attitudes in
every study indicates that the exact wording of the question is not
important. Wherever the line between death-qualified and excludable
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citizens is drawn, the former group will hold attitudes more favorable to
the prosecution. The relevance of studies involving attitudes toward the
criminal justice system is strongly suggested by ( l) the direct connection
between the attitudes measured and the jurors' task, (2) the argument
that the excluded jurors share a perspective that is different from that of
the qualified jurors, and (3) the fact that the attitudinal studies and the
more direct studies of conviction rates reach identical conclusions. Both
the Hovey opinion and the Grigsby opinion explicitly considered the
relevance of the attitudinal studies, and found that, taken in conjunction
with the other studies, they were important. Here, as elsewhere, the
Lockhart opinion chose to ignore the conclusions reached by the
"traditional testing mechanisms of the adversary system."
One study (Haney, 1984) showed that the very process of questioning
jurors intensively about their attitudes toward capital punishment
before the trial suggested to the jurors that the defendant was probably
guilty. Thus added to the bias caused by the composition of the jury was
a bias caused by the experience of the death-qualifying voir dire. This
study was dismissed from consideration because it "would not, standing
alone, give rise to a constitutional violation," (Lockhart, 1986, p. 1763).
Again the Court's logic seems to be that if each study is insufficient
evidence on its own, then all 15 put together must also be insufficient. If
one payment, standing alone, is insufficient to buy a house, then it
should not be considered in conjunction with others in assessing the
means of the purchaser.
Three studies were rejected because they were the studies that had
been before the Court in Witherspoon, albeit in preliminary form: "It
goes almost without saying that if these studies were 'too tentative and
fragmentary' to make out a claim of constitutional error in 1968, the
same studies, unchanged but for having aged some 18 years, are still
insufficient to make out such a claim in this case" (Lockhart, 1986, p.
1763). In fact, the studies were not "unchanged"; preliminary drafts had
become completed, fully-documented reports. The briefs and the lower
court opinions were clear on this point. More important, the conclusions
of the first study on a new research topic are nearly always "tentative." It
takes replication to establish the truth and generality of a scientific
finding and in turn to establish the validity of the early work. Having
been replicated, the early conclusions were no longer tentative. The
Supreme Court's assessment of the early research is analogous to
claiming that Alexander Fleming's discovery of penicillin is of trivial
medical importance because in 1930 the scientific community felt that
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the prospects for using it to cure infections in humans were discouraging.
Two of the studies demonstrating conviction-proneness were rejected
because they did not include jury deliberation and because they did not
identify and exclude jurors who might admit to being unable to make a
fair decision on the guilt of a capital defendant. No explanation was
given for why deliberation is essential, and indeed, research on juries has
consistently shown that the distribution of individual first-ballot
verdicts is a very good predictor of the final jury verdict (Kalven and
Zeise I, 1966; Hastie et al., 1983). Several of the studies rejected on other
grounds did identify and exclude people who could not judge guilt
fairly, and the overall bias was demonstrated in these studies as strongly
or more strongly than in the studies that did not take this precaution.
The "flaws" identified in individual studies were in no instance fatal
flaws. But more important, the one-by-one elimination of studies from a
consistent body of research shows an ignorance of the principle of
convergent validity. The idea that new scientific truths are proven by
means of a single, perfect, definitive experiment is generally mistaken.
Typically there are numerous sources of error and numerous confounding variables that must be controlled, and typically it is impossible
to control them all in a single study. Thus the scientist must triangulate
in on the truth by ruling out some alternative explanations in some
experiments and other alternative explanations in other experiments
until only one explanation is left that can account for the results of all
the experiments. This is the method of convergent validation. If all the
studies share the same shortcoming, then that shortcoming may be a
possible alternative explanation that has not yet been ruled out. But if
the experiments have different limitations, then none of the limitations
can serve as an explanation for a result that is consistent across all the
experiments.
For example, in order to show that death-qualified jurors vote guilty
more often than the jurors who are normally excluded, it is important to
demonstrate that in response to the very same trial more of the deathqualified jurors vote guilty. Since in the "real world" each case is tried
only once, before a single jury, the only way to expose many juries to the
very same trial is to conduct a simulation, as Cowan et al. (1984) did.
Simulations can always be criticized, however, on the grounds that
people may behave differently on real juries.
In this case, the argument might be that on real juries people's
verdicts are not influenced by their attitudes toward the death penalty.
Zeisel's (1968) study of actual jurors, though lacking the control of the
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Cowan et al. study, showed that the correlation between death penalty
attitudes and guilty votes is not restricted to simulated juries. The fact
that both studies reached the same result shows that this result could not
be due to any "flaw" unique to either study. If 10 studies were done to
test the effectiveness of a new drug, five on samples of women and five
on samples of men, and all showed that the drug cured the disease, the
logic of the Lockhart opinion would compel the conclusion that we have
no information about the drug's effectiveness, since five of the studies
should be dropped from consideration because they included no
women, and the other five because they included no men, leaving not a
single study. The lower court opinions in Hovey and in Grigsby
contained extensive discussions of the principle of convergent validation
and the necessity of viewing the studies "as a whole, not in isolation"
(Hovey, 1980, p. 1343). The APA brief in Lockhart contained a clear
account of the value of convergent validation, as did the dissenting
opinion:
The chief strength of respondent's evidence lies in the essential
unanimity of the results obtained by researchers using diverse
subjects and varied methodologies. Even the Court's haphazard
jibes cannot obscure the power of the array. (Lockhart, 1986,
Marshall, J., dissenting, p. 1773).
Nonetheless, the majority managed to miss the point.
2. No bias exists because none of the jurors who tried McCree was
biased.
Having completed its excursion into the unfamiliar realm of social
science criticism, the Court returned to its own turf-the close analysis
of the individual case-and focused on McCree's particular jury. Since
the 12 people who served on McCree'sjury had all said they could judge
the case impartially, the Court concluded that it was therefore a neutral
jury. The social scientists argued that across many trials it could be
demonstrated that juries comprised only of death-qualified jurors were
not neutral, because the proportion of guilty verdicts would be higher
than it would be in juries that included the whole spectrum of death
penalty attitudes. The probability of guilty verdicts is affected by the
group that is not there-just as it would be if Catholics (or atheists) were
never allowed on juries in abortion cases. Social scientists are trained to
think in terms of comparison. Death-qualified juries are not biased or
unbiased in some absolute sense; rather they are biased toward guilty
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verdicts relative to the juries that try all other cases in American courts.
Following the Court's reasoning, it would be constitutional to exclude
all Republicans, or all people with a college education, or any other
group, as long as 12 impartial jurors remained.
Although aggregate, comparative statistical reasoning is uncommon
for courts, it is by no means beyond their capacity. In Ballew v. Georgia
(1978) the Supreme Court considered a variety of empirical studies of
jury size and concluded that juries composed of only five people were
unconstitutional; the Court did not examine the competence of the
particular group of five people who tried Ballew, but reached a general
conclusion based on general data. More to the point, the Court in
Witherspoon found that by excluding all opponents of the death penalty
from the penalty decision, "the state crossed the line of neutrality. In its
quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the state
produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die"
( Witherspoon, 1968, p. 520-521). The fact that the 12 people who did try
Witherspoon's case all said that they could be fair and impartial was
irrelevant. The logic of the Court's decision on bias at the penalty phase
of Witherspoon was exactly the same as the logic of the argument on
bias at the guilt phase in McCree's case.
The Lockhart Court bolstered its faulty reasoning with two other
spurious arguments. The majority opinion claimed that McCree was
asking that every single jury be perfectly representative of the community, with "the proper number of Democrats and Republicans,
young persons and old persons, white-collar executives and blue-collar
laborers, and so on" (Lockhart, 1986, p. 1767). McCree's brief is quite
explicit on this point, admitting that "no defendant can demand that all
elements of the community be included on his or her jury," but arguing
that no state has the "right to remove an entire class of jurors from every
capital jury." (McCree, brief, p. 88). For example, ifl were on trial, I
could not claim unfairness if, by the luck of the draw, there were no
female professors on my jury. But I could reasonably claim unfairness if,
at the beginning of jury selection, the judge told all the female professors
in the room that they were disqualified from serving in my case. The
Lockhart Court confused these two very different positions.
Finally, the Court argued that there is no problem because McCree
might have gotten the very same jury by chance, even if death
qualification did not exist: "[l]t is hard for us to understand the logic of
the argument that a given jury is unconstitutionally partial when it
results from a state-ordained process, yet impartial when exactly the
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same jury results from mere chance" (Lockhart, 1986, p. 1767). Leaving
aside the fact that the likelihood that McCree would have gotten
"exactly the same jury" by chance is minuscule, the idea that any
practice is constitutional as long as any particular consequence of that
practice could have occurred by chance is astounding. All-white juries
are possible by chance; therefore blacks may be banned from jury
service. A defendant might have confessed to a crime inadvertently;
therefore defendants may be forced to confess. Or Mr. McCree could
argue that the woman he was accused of killing might by chance have
been struck by lightning that day, so why was his act illegal?
Again, the lower court opinions avoided these mistakes, recognizing
that it was necessary to compare one type of jury with the other, not
simply to examine the 12 jurors in a particular case:
The issue is not whether non-death-qualified jurors are acquittal
prone or death-qualification jurors are conviction prone. The real
issue is whether a death-qualified jury is more prone to convict
than the juries used in non-capital criminal cases-juries which
include the full spectrum of attitudes and perspectives regarding
capital punishment [ Grigsby v. Mabry, 1985, p. 241, note 31].
It can be confidently asserted that, over time, some persons
accused of capital crimes will be convicted of offenses-and to a
higher degree-who would not be so convicted if the jury were
more representative of the populace [Hovey v. Superior Court,
1980, p. 1314, note 57].
3. The excluded jurors are not a distinctive group. The majority
opinion held that death-qualified jurors were not a "distinctive group"
whose elimination would impair jury representativeness. From the
perspective of social science, the excluded jurors are obviously a
distinctive group. They can easily be distinguished from other jurors on
the basis of their answers to a few simple questions asked during the voir
dire and in study after study their attitudes and behavior have been
significantly different from those of other jurors.
In this case the obvious social science argument is insufficient to
answer the legal question. Most previous cases on jury representativeness had dealt with the exclusion of blacks, women, or Mexican
Americans, groups that have enjoyed special constitutional protection
in recent years. Although one of the justifications for including these
groups on juries was that the absence of their distinctive attitudes and
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perspectives would result in a jury that did not reflect the common-sense
judgment of the whole community, it was not the only justification.
There was also the need to eliminate formal discrimination against these
historically disadvantaged groups.
During oral argument in Lockhart, McCree's counsel was asked
numerous questions about other attitudinal groups that might claim a
constitutional right to representation on juries. Some Justices may have
feared that the case could set a dangerous precedent. McCree's counsel
argued first of all, that no other attitudinal group of fair and impartial
jurors was automatically excluded from jury service, and second, that
no other attitudes had been found to affect verdicts as powerfully as
attitudes toward the death penalty. Judge Eisele, in the District Court
opinion in Grigsby v. Mabry (1983) concluded that shared attitudes
were an insufficient criterion to define a constitutionally "distinctive"
group unless it could be shown that the presence or absence of those
attitudes actually affected the functioning of the jury. He went on to
conclude that the attitudinal exclusion created by death qualification
had a substantial adverse effect on the functioning of the jury and thus
was unconstitutional. He also pointed out that the representation of
unimpeachably cognizable groups was impaired by the process of death
qualification because blacks and women are more likely to be excluded
are than white males.
Justice Rehnquist chose not to follow this reasoning, holding for the
majority in Lockhart that a group defined solely in terms of shared
attitudes is not a constitutionally distinctive group that needs to be
considered in assessing jury representativeness. "Unlike blacks, women,
and Mexican-Americans,' Witherspoon-excludables' are singled out for
exclusion in capital cases on the basis of an attribute that is within the
individual's control" (Lockhart, 1986, p. 1766). This analysis may also
lead some observers to fear a dangerous precedent, suggesting that
citizens may be banned from jury service on the basis of unpopular
religious or other beliefs.
4. The constitutional requirement of representativeness is satisfied if
the jury pool is representative. The majority opinion in Lockhart cited
several precedents holding that the right to a representative jury did not
mean that every single group of 12 citizens who sit as a jury must
proportionally reproduce the characteristics of the population: "The
point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the
community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels
are drawn" (Justice Blackmun, Pope v. United States (1971), cited in
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Lockhart, ( 1986, p. 1765). McCree, of course, was not arguing that his
jury must include people adamantly opposed to the death penalty, but
that such a person must have the same chance of inclusion as a deathqualified juror. To say that the fair cross-section requirement was met
because the names of these people were put in the box from which the
panels were drawn is a childish effort at sleight-of-hand. One doesn't
have to have any statistical training to realize that in order to achieve
representativeness, the names must not only be put in the box, they must
still be in the box when the names of the actual panel members are
drawn. True, the names of the death-penalty opponents are put in the
box, but then they are all taken out again, and then the actual jury is
drawn. Obviously, their chances of serving on a capital jury are exactly
the same as if they had never had their names in the box at all: zero.
Again, the courts in Hovey and Grigsby avoided this error. The
opinion in Grigsby, which was reversed by the Lockhart decision,
explicitly stated:

[I] Any implication by the dissent suggesting the majority requires
representation of all cognizable groups on each petit jury is
misplaced. [cites omitted] Our holding simply forbids the systematic exclusion of any cognizable group from a petitjury" [ Grigsby
v. Mabry, (1985) p. 230, n. 6].
and
[2] There is no functional difference between excluding a particular
group of eligible citizens from the "jury wheels, pools of names,
panels or venires from which juries are drawn" and systematically
excluding them from sitting on a petit jury [cites omitted]. The
result is the same in either case: a distinct group of the citizenry is
prevented from being considered for service on petit juries
[ Grigsby, 1985, p. 230, n. 7].
5. The state has a legitimate interest in a single jury to decide both
guilt and penalty. The Witherspoon opinion explicitly recognized that if
future research established that death-qualified juries were

less than neutral with respect to guilt ... the question would then
arise whether the state's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a
jury capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at
the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair
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determination of guilt or innocence-given the possibility of
accommodating both interests by means of a bifurcated trial
[ Witherspoon, 1968, p. 520, n. 18].
Justice Rehnquist did not admit that the bias of death-qualified juries
had been established, but he did go on to argue that the state had a
legitimate interest in "obtaining a single jury that could impartially
decide all of the issues in McCree's case" (Lockhart, 1986, p. 1768).
Neither the state's brief nor the opinion in Lockhart is very clear in
explaining why a single jury system serves an important state interest.
One argument that was repeatedly raised in the brief and at oral
argument was that the excluded jurors were people who would not
follow state law, and the state had a legitimate interest in keeping
lawbreakers off the jury. Since the excluded jurors were lawbreakers
only in the sense that they would not vote to execute anyone, this
argument simply restates the basic issue. The group in question included
only people who said they could follow state law in deciding guilt or
innocence, and they were asking only to be included in the guilt/innocence stage of the trial. Thus the state's interest in a single jury is not
really addressed by this argument.
A second argument was that having two separate juries would be
costly and inefficient. The Court seemed to assume that the only remedy
would be to have two entirely different groups of jurors decide guilt and
penalty, although various other methods, less expensive and less
cumbersome, had been suggested in the lower court opinion ( Grigsby v.
Mabry, 1985). In any case the cost/efficiency argument was never very
explicit, perhaps because it seemed tasteless to weigh such considerations
against the fairness of the trial.
Finally, the Court reiterated an argument that had first been made in
Smith v. Balkcom ( 1981) and had become standard in court decisions
that found that death qualification was constitutional. Even though a
juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt when he or she votes to
convict a defendant, there still may be some residual, "whimsical"
doubts about the evidence. These residual doubts might cause the juror
to hesitate to execute the defendant; thus it is in the defendants best
interest to have the same jurors decide both guilt and penalty in order to
profit from the mercy associated with whimsical doubts.
Whether such residual doubts are common and whether they result in
a reluctance to vote for death are, of course, empirical questions,just as
surely as the conviction-proneness of death-qualified jurors is an
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empirical question. The difference is that there is not a scrap of empirical
evidence on the residual doubt question. 8 Yet the Court rejects the
evidence on conviction-proneness because 14 of the 15 studies have
some flaw, and endorses the residual doubt argument based on no
evidence whatsoever. And of course the argument that a single jury
increases one's chances for a sentence of life imprisonment rather than
death is likely to seem cold comfort to a defend ant who believes he was
unfairly convicted in the first place. As Finch and Ferraro (1986) argue,
"The trade-off suggested by the court-a more conviction-prone jury
for a less death-prone jury-seems one that the accused is unlikely to
make" (p. 69-70, n. 169).
6. None ofthe research examined real jurors' decisions in real capital
cases. There is one criticism made by the majority in Lockhart that
applies to all of the empirical research. The studies investigated the
behavior of people "who were not actual jurors sworn under oath to
apply the law to the facts of an actual case involving the fate of an actual
capital defendant" (Lockhart, 1986, p. 1763). Zeisel's study had
investigated the behavior of sworn jurors in actual felony cases, but they
were not capital cases. Of course the very existence of the questionable
practice makes it impossible to carry out the "perfect" research to
condemn or exonerate the practice. If no Witherspoon-excludable
citizens are allowed on the jury in any capital case, then it is impossible
to discover how their behavior might differ from that of the deathqualified jurors, and the suggestion in Witherspoon that future research
might establish a bias toward guilt in death-qualified juries becomes
meaningless. The Witherspoon court assumed that the question could
be answered empirically; the Lockhart decision seemed to assume that it
can not, at least not in this world.
The decisions in Hovey and Grigsby recognized that the "perfect"
experiment would have two juries hearing each of a large number of
capital cases, one jury empaneled with the usual method of death
qualification, the other questioned only about their ability to be fair and
impartial in deciding guilt, each jury believing that it was responsible for
the decision. The lower court decisions also recognized that "such an
experiment is legally impossible." Thus, "the hypothesis must be tested
indirectly" (Hovey, 1980, p. 1315). "[I]t is the courts who have often
stood in the way of surveys involving real jurors and we should not now
reject a study because of this deficiency" ( Grigsby, 1985, p. 237).
In his dissenting opinion in Lockhart, Justice Marshall argued that
the absence of the impossible "perfect" study is compensated by the
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convergence of findings in all the studies conducted: "Where studies
have identified and corrected apparent flaws in prior investigations, the
results of the subsequent work have only corroborated the conclusions
drawn in the earlier efforts" (Marshall, J., dissenting Lockhart, 1986, p.
1773). When the bulk of the data (or in this case, all of the data) points to
one conclusion across many settings the scientific "burden of proof"
shifts to those who would discredit the data to propose some hypothesis
to explain why the findings will not apply in a new setting-in this case,
to explain why the excluded jurors would be expected to behave like the
death-qualified jurors if they sat on a real capital case.
A more respectable version of the majority's concern is that the
research can not predict the magnitude of the bias created by the
practice of death qualification. How many cases would come out
differently? The opinion quoted Finch and Ferraro, who attempted to
estimate the size of the biasing effect of death qualification, and
concluded that "no definite conclusions can be stated as to the frequency
or magnitude of the effects of death qualification" (1986, p. 66). The
opinion did not quote Finch and Ferraro's statement that "extant
research findings may actually understate the magnitude of the problem
raised by death qualification" (1986, p. 62). It is quite true that estimates
of the magnitude of the bias are likely to be highly unreliable. It could be
more serious or less serious than the studies suggest. There is no
question, however, that there is a bias.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

Ordinarily, and especially recently, the Supreme Court has been
reluctant to reconsider the factual conclusions of the lower courts,
preferring to rely on the "traditional testing mechanisms of the
adversary process" to reveal the facts most clearly to the judge who
actually witnesses this testing. In this case, the court of appeals affirmed
the district court's findings, and previous Supreme Court decisions had
held that the Supreme Court "cannot undertake to review concurrent
findings of fact by two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and
exceptional showing of error" ( Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde, 1949, at 275; see also United States v. Doe, 1984).9 Given that the
lower courts had dealt extensively with all of the considerations raised in
the majority's analysis of the empirical research, where was the obvious
error? The answer is that despite the Court's criticisms of the research,
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the quality of the research and the lower court's factual findings were not
at issue, "[b]ecause we do not ultimately base our decision today on the
invalidity of the lower courts' 'factual' findings." (Lockhart 1986, p.
1762, n. 3). The Court was unwilling to assert that the studies are invalid,
but unwilling to admit that they are valid. With masterful condescension,
the Court revealed that it was willing to set aside its better judgment and
accept the empirical conclusions. Nevertheless, the practice of death
qualification remains constitutional.
Having identified some of the more serious problems with
McCree's studies, however, we will assume for purposes of this
opinion that the studies are both methodologically valid and
adequate to establish that "death-qualification" in fact produces
juries somewhat more "conviction-prone" than "non-death-qualified" juries. We hold, nonetheless, that the Constitution does not
prohibit the states from "death-qualifying" juries in capital cases
[Lockhart, 1986, p. 1764].
Basically, the majority held that a jury of 12 impartial people was an
impartial jury for constitutional purposes, as long as no traditionally
protected group, such as blacks or women, is excluded.
It seems that the Court's only plausible course was to decide that the
basic question was not an empirical question after all. Even if it were
possible to demonstrate the biasing effects of death qualification on the
outcome of real capital cases, it would make no difference. In capital
cases it is constitutional to decide guilt or innocence with juries that are
biased toward conviction. In other words, despite the explicit question
raised in Witherspoon, death qualification is immune to empirical
challenge.
CONCLUSION

In the 1980s the public strongly favors capital punishment. In most
cases this attitude is based on very little information. The desire to
acquire more information is negligible, and when new information
contrary to one's attitude is learned, the attitude remains unchanged
(Ellsworth and Ross, 1983). The Supreme Court and the public have
something in common in this regard.
The majority of the Court has been ideologically committed to the
constitutionality of capital punishment since 1976. In addition to the
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ideological commitment, there is the practical problem of the everincreasing number of prisoners under sentence of death. If the death
penalty, or some common feature of its administration such as racial
bias or death qualification, were to be declared unconstitutional,
hundreds of convicted murderers might have to be dealt with all over
again. Since Furman, the Court's opinions on the death penalty have
often been plurality opinions, confusing and contradictory. When a
particular practice has been held unconstitutional, the decision has
typically affected very few cases. As Gross and Mauro remarked,
"Furman became the fountainhead of an expanding swamp of uncertain
rules and confusing opinions" (1984).
In part, this messy line of constitutional doctrine is a function of the
Court's attempts to circumvent the empirical data. Opponents of capital
punishment, in particular the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, have relied heavily on empirical arguments in their challenges to
the death penalty. Their use of data has been extraordinarily sophisticated, and their preparation of empirical challenges exceptionally
thorough. Therefore the Court's evasion of the data is bound to blur the
issues, and it makes the Court's handling of death penalty cases look less
competent than its handling of other issues.
An alternative hypothesis worth considering is that the Court is
generally reluctant to give serious consideration to social science data,
and the recent history of opinions on capital punishment has more to do
with the Court's attitude toward social science than with its position on
the death penalty. Although it is true that the Court has been skeptical of
data in other contexts (cf. Ellsworth and Getman, 1987), I do not think
this general reluctance can explain the Court's response to data that
challenge capital punishment or its administration. First, the Court has
considered data on racial discrimination and jury composition in other
contexts, and has ruled in accordance with weaker data than those
presented in death cases (Griggs v. Duke Power and Light Co., 1971;
Ballew v. Georgia, 1978).
Second, the Court has cited empirical evidence when it supports the
constitutionality of the death penalty. A good example is the use of
public opinion data. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment has been interpreted as a prohibition against
punishments that are seen as excessive or barbaric in contemporary
society. Thus punishments that were acceptable when the Constitution
was written, such as mutilation, may be found to be cruel and unusual by
later generations ( Weems v. United States, 1910; Trop v. Dulles, 1958).
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In the years just preceding Furman, public attitudes toward capital
punishment were evenly split, and in some polls opponents outnumbered
proponents. These polls were used by those who challenged capital
punishment to argue that the death penalty was cruel and unusual by
contemporary standards.
Since then, however, polls have shown increasing levels of support
for the death penalty. Since 1976 the Court has often referred to
evidence from opinion surveys and state referenda, new legislation, and
jury verdicts-"objective indicia that reflect the public attitude" to
support its conclusion that "a large proportion of American society
continues to regard death as an appropriate and necessary criminal
sanction" ( Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, p. 878), and thus not cruel and
unusual by contemporary standards. Likewise, in 1977, when the
Supreme Court held that the death penalty for rape was disproportionate and excessive, and therefore unconstitutional, the opinion
relied heavily on empirical data indicating that the public rejected the
death penalty for rape (Coker v. Georgia, 1977).
The most telling evidence that the Court's opinions are a product of
the Justices' attitudes toward capital punishment rather than their
attitudes toward social science is the case of Barefoot v. Estelle ( 1983). In
order to sentence a person to death in Texas, the jury must find that the
convicted person is likely to be a continuing threat to society, that is, the
jury must predict that he or she will commit dangerous acts in the future.
There is substantial consensus among social scientists that the field has
not advanced to the stage at which predictions of dangerousness can be
made with any accuracy. In Barefoot, then, the American Psychiatric
Association argued against the use of expert testimony on future
dangerousness, because the data indicated that the predictions of
experts are usually wrong. The Court, however, held that the Texas law
was constitutional, and that experts should be allowed to testify about
whether or not the defendant would pose a continuing threat to society.
In Texas, the prediction of future dangerousness is usually the only issue
the jury must decide in determining whether to execute a defendant. One
would expect that the criteria for evaluating the psychiatric evidence
would thus be particularly stringent. Instead, the majority found such
evidence satisfactory because "Neither petitioner nor the [American
Psychiatric] Association suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong
with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time" (Barefoot v.
Estelle 1983, p. 901).

208

CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

In Barefoot the Court accepted a form of social science "evidence"
that was strongly repudiated by the scientific community in order to
uphold the constitutionality of the administration of the death penalty
in Texas. In Lockhart and in McCleskey the Court rejected empirical
arguments that were strongly endorsed by the scientific community in
order to uphold the constitutionality of the administration of the death
penalty. The parsimonious explanation for the failure of social science
data to influence the Court in death penalty cases seems to be that the
outcome of these cases is frequently a foregone conclusion.
NOTES
I. These figures were derived from a computerized search of the LEXIS (Mead data)
library.
2. An alternative argument in favor of deterrence is that by punishing certain crimes
by death, a government communicates to its citizens that these crimes are completely
intolerable. The existence of the punishment teaches the people that murder is evil.
Opponents of the death penalty would argue that most people learn that murder is
unacceptable whether or not their state or country executes murderers. Some opponents
argue that capital punishment actually teaches people the opposite-that killing human
beings is sometimes the right thing to do.
3. Of course there are many different ways of determining the proportion of cases in
which defendants are sentenced to death because there are many different ways of defining
the relevant universe of cases. The figure of 8 out of IO was cited by the Court itself in the
plurality opinions in Gregg v. Georgia and Woodson v. North Carolina handed down a
year before Coker. It was cited in support of the propositions (a) that the public accepted
capital punishment but felt that is was only appropriate for a few extreme cases, and (b)
that the public would therefore reject mandatory death penalty laws. The figure of 8 out of
10 agrees fairly well with the I 983 findings of Baldus et al.
4. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) argued
that the jury would not be truly representative of the conscience of the community unless
all members of the community had a chance of serving at the penalty trial as well as the
guilt/ innocence trial.
5. The Court has been criticized for relying on bad research and for misinterpreting
some of the social science evidence in the earlier jury cases. I do not claim that the Justices
used the data well. My only point is that the Court has sought out social science research in
Sixth Amendment cases, and has incorporated it into several major decisions.
6. Grigsby died in prison; McCree's case had been joined to his; thus the name change.
Two lower courts had previously held that the factual evidence was immaterial to the
constitutionality of death-qualified juries (Smith v. Balckom, 1982; Keeten v. Garrison,
1984), but the courts that actually considered the evidence had all concluded that death
qualification biases juries against capital defendants on the issue of guilt (Hovey, Grigsby
and Keeten v. Garrison (W.D.N.C. 1984).
7. The one possible alternative might have been to condemn the practice on the
ground that excluding any group, however defined, violated the representativeness of the
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jury. This was the position Justice Douglas took in his dissent in Witherspoon.
8. The opposite hypothesis, that a new set of jurors would be less convinced of the
rightness of the guilty verdict than the jurors who were responsible for that verdict, seems
at least as plausible.
9. Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court is not bound by lower court decisions with
regard to this sort oflegislative fact finding. However, the fact that they are not bound by
the lower court's review hardly justifies the majority Justices' complete failure to consider
the lower court analyses of exactly the same facts that were discussed-and misunderstood-in the Supreme Court opinion.
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